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Abstract
The literature  argues that the presence  of multiple veto  the net effect of multiple veto players is positive or
players (government decisionmakers)  with polarized  negative. Second, though, the authors go beyond the
interests  increases the credibility of sovereign  existing literature  to argue that the net effect of multiple
commitments,  but reduces the ability of governments  to  veto players depends on the  nature of social  polarization
adjust policies in  the event of exogenous  shocks  that  in a country.  In particular,  they argue that political
jeopardize  their ability to honor their commitments.  In  competition  is fundamentally different in countries
the case of sovereign lending,  if the first effect prevails,  exhibiting ethnic  polarization than in countries polarized
countries would be  regarded as more creditworthy;  if the  according to income  or wealth. The evidence  supports
second,  less.  the prediction  that multiple veto players matter more
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A key issue in political economy and development is, under what conditions can
governments  commit themselves credibly to policy promises and respond flexibly to
crisis? The answer to this question should depend on both institutional and societal
characteristics,  but the literature generally treats these factors separately.  One literature
has found that social polarization (in the form of income inequality, ethnic tensions or
other differences) undermines both the credibility of government promises and the ability
to respond to crisis. This research, however,  abstracts from the role of political
institutions and treats all forms of social polarization identically. Another literature finds
that institutions, particularly the number of veto players in a country (or checks and
balances),  are key to credibility, but pays less attention to social characteristics  such as
polarization.  In this paper we revisit these linkages.
We examine the creditworthiness  of countries,  a variable that is uniquely sensitive
to both the credibility and the ability of governments  to respond promptly to shocks, to
illuminate three issues left open in the existing literature. First, it is difficult to draw
conclusions  from the literature on the net effect of characteristics of countries that affect
both credibility and flexibility, but in opposite directions. This is particularly important
for institutions such as checks and balances, which have been found to increase the first
at the expense of the second.  In a first approximation to this issue we find that checks  and
balances have a weak positive effect on creditworthiness - that is, the positive credibility
effects outweigh the negative rigidity effects of multiple veto players.
Second, although many results on polarization depend on assumptions about
institutions, and vice versa, there has been no systematic investigation of how the effects
1of one depend on the other. This paper examines the effects of social polarization under
different political conditions, including elections and checks and balances.  We find that
the effects of polarization depend strongly on the competitiveness  of elections and the
number of veto players.
Finally, Mancur Olson's work firmly establishes that the influence of special
interests depends in part on their ability to overcome problems of collective action. The
literature on polarization implicitly assumes  that different  forms of polarization (e.g.,
income, ethnic, or linguistic) have identical  effects on society.  We speculate, however,
that the effects of ethnic and linguistic social groupings are likely to differ from those of
income-based groupings. Olson (1982: ch. 6), for example, observed that successful
distributional coalitions are often based on encouragement of ethnic prejudice and
endogamy.  In fact, we find that political institutions interact with these two dimensions of
social polarization in opposite ways. Namely, an increase in income or wealth inequality
makes it more likely that countries will default on their debt obligations, but this effect is
strongest  when democratic institutions such as checks and balances or competitive
elections are most prevalent. However, although an increase in ethnic or linguistic
polarization  also increases the probability of default, this effect is weakest when
democratic institutions are most prevalent.
2. The literature on polarization, institutions, credibility and delay
Creditworthiness  is a function both of the credibility of governments - the
likelihood that they will honor their lending agreements - and of their flexibility - the
likelihood that, in response to negative fiscal shocks, they will adapt fiscal policy to new
exigencies and continue servicing their debt. Thus, creditworthiness captures two
2qualities of government that have been the focus of substantial research. One literature
looks at the security of property and contractual  rights, including the risk that government
will expropriate illiquid assets. Svensson (1998) argues that a conflict of interest between
two polarized parties that alternate in office will lead them to under-invest in a secure
legal environment.  Easterly and Levine (1997) conclude that ethnic polarization
undermines economic growth, in part through adoption of less efficient  economic policies
which presumably contribute to reduced creditworthiness.
Keefer and Knack (2002) appeal to social choice reasoning to argue that increased
polarization among decision makers can produce larger swings among different policies.
Polarization has the effect of expanding the set of alternative policies that decision
makers can propose to replace the current policy (e.g., the current policy to repay a loan
that the government has received). Their argument shows immediately the effects of
institutional assumptions. If multiple polarized groups vote, using majority rule,
increased polarization increases policy instability and makes current government
promises less credible.  If multiple polarized groups each have veto power, then no
change in policy can occur unless all agree,  and increased polarization has no effect on
policy instability.
North and Weingast (1989) specifically examine the effect of multiple veto
players on the credibility of loan agreements.  They show that the risk that the English
Crown would not repay loans extended by Dutch lenders was significantly dampened by
the presence of multiple veto players - the checks and balances  introduced by a newly
powerful parliament following the Glorious Revolution.  They do not ask what happens
when polarization of preferences  increases.  Keefer and Stasavage (2000) do consider the
3interaction of  polarization and the number of veto players, but in a specific application,
the credibility of monetary policy.
Another literature has analyzed why governments  sometimes respond with
significant delay to crisis. Alesina and Drazen (1991)  assume that polarized decision
makers also exercise  veto power over government decision making. They find that
polarized interests who are each unsure about the costs delay imposes on the others have
an incentive to  delay reform even when doing so leaves everyone worse off. Rodrik
(1999) argues that countries recover faster from inflation shocks if they have "consensus-
building" institutions. However, rather than model such institutions politically - the
extent of elections,  checks and balances,  etc. - he uses the security of property rights and
similar variables to proxy for consensus-building institutions.
Creditworthiness  is also affected by the sheer volume of country borrowing.
Holding constant moral hazard problems  and the likely response of countries to fiscal
crisis, countries that have a higher demand for  loans,  and therefore more debt, are likely
to be less creditworthy.  Alesina and Gatti (1995) and Berg and Sachs (1988) both link
polarization to the magnitude of government spending and, by implication, to
indebtedness. Alesina and Gatti (1995)  assume, like Svensson (1998), that there are no
checks  and balances, but rather two political parties that alternate  in power. They show
that if these parties have polarized preferences over government spending, they are likely
to raise spending (or incur debts) in order to reduce the fiscal discretion of their
successors. l Berg and Sachs (1988), on the other hand, argue that in more unequal
1 McGuire and Olson (1996) show formally that the mere presence of instability, independent of preference
differences over government spending,  encourages governments  to take actions in the present with high
future costs.
4societies,  in which the rich control both economic and political life, pressures for
redistribution  are likely to lead to higher borrowing and therefore higher interest rates.2
These different contributions imply that polarization should have little or no effect
on government response to crisis if  polarized groups are not also veto players (Svensson
1998, Keefer and Knack 2002, Alesina and Drazen  1991) - in fact, Alesina and Drazen
specifically point to cases where the unified control of government by a singie partisan
interest led to  a quick resolution of crisis. Assuming polarization,  the literature  suggests
that multiple veto players will increase credibility (North and Weingast  1989, Keefer and
Stasavage 2000), but provides arguments both in favor and against the proposition that
they will reduce flexibility.  While multiple veto players are a necessary condition for a
delayed response to crisis in Alesina and Drazen (1991), multiple veto players may be
precisely the sort of "consensus-building"  institution that yields the faster response to
crisis in polarized countries that Rodrik (1999) predicts.  In any case, the literature
provides no prediction as to which effect -- credibility or delay -- will dominate. Finally,
all of these studies treat polarized groups as being identical in their internal
characteristics.  The next section asks how predictions about the effects of social
polarization should be modified if the internal characteristics  of the polarized groups are
heterogeneous.
2 In their argument,  it is not clear why the rich, politically powerful by assumption,  would accede to more
redistribution in the first place,  and why redistributive pressures, per se, would lead to larger debt.
However,  in a recent paper, Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) argue  that the threat of insurrection leads the
rich elite to democratize (expand the  franchise),  leading to more political pressures to redistribute.  In more
unequal countries, larger amounts of redistribution  are triggered by democratization,  giving elites a larger
incentive to stage counter-coups.  Evidence  in support of the theory is mixed:  they point effectively to a
number of country case studies, but cross-country evidence  reveals little association between either
redistribution and inequality or between inequality and political violence.
53. The effects  of polarization when polarized groups are heterogeneous
A substantial  literature points to the importance throughout history and across
many cultures of intra-ethnic social and economic  exchange, ranging from marriage to
trade.  Intra-ethnic  exchange may be driven by cultural mores and the prejudices of or
about other ethnic groups, but it is also catalyzed by the greater possibilities of credible
contracting within an ethnic group (Landa 1981, Greif 1989). Not all ethnic groups in all
places and times exhibit dense patterns of social and economic exchange.  The point is
only that they are more frequent features of ethnic or linguistic groups than of income
groups (although social exchange is often restricted across classes).
A dense pattern of exchange is likely to support the credibility of intra-group
promises.  For example, as Greif (1989) demonstrates, the threat of future exclusion from
these exchanges is a powerful device for the deterrence of reneging. Ethnic groups,
relative to income-based groups, are therefore more likely to overcome obstacles to
collective action since, as Olson (1965)  first pointed out, groups that cannot enforce
contribution commitments by all members to the cause of the group are unlikely to be
effective special interests. To the extent that intra-ethnic group ties are stronger than
intra-income group ties, we would therefore expect ethnolinguistic groups to be more
successful "special interests".  Therefore, we would expect an increase in ethnolinguistic
polarization to most reduce creditworthiness in those institutional environments  that are
most permeable to special interests rather than the interests of the "median voter": where
elections are non-competitive,  and where checks and balances are absent that might
otherwise serve to pit competing special interests against each other.
6If intra-group promises are significantly more credible than inter-group  promises
across ethnic groups, but not across income groups, then there are also important
implications for the strategies of politicians. In particular, promises made to a particular
ethnic  group by competing candidates  from that ethnic group are more credible than
promises made by those candidates  to other ethnic groups.  The consequences  of reneging
on those promises include restricted access to the wide range of interactions  that
characterize membership  in the ethnic group. Within income groups, in contrast, this
threat is less severe and the credibility of promises of politicians from any one income
group is likely to be similar across interest groups.
Where candidate promises are credible, and there are no information or other
problems, candidates converge on the median voter's preferred  outcome. Although the
median voter has no particular reason to prefer high levels of spending that fund current
consumption at the expense of future consumption,  this restraint disappears if candidate
promises are only credible to part of the electorate. In that case, Keefer (2002) argues that
candidates will tilt their promises in favor of the group to which credible promises  can be
made, at the expense of the remainder of society.  Since all of society bears the costs of
low creditworthiness,  but the ethnic group gets all of the benefits of increased spending,
the median ethnic group "voter" will prefer high spending,  and creditworthiness drops.
This effect should be greatest, however,  when:
*  only one ethnic group is represented  in government - when there are no checks
and balances;
*  voters from other ethnic  groups have the least influence on selecting government
officials - reducing the penalty that members of non-favored ethnic groups can
7impose on leaders from other ethnic groups who drive down country
creditworthiness.
Perhaps most importantly, when institutions themselves provide a basis for credible
promises by politicians  across all ethnic groups, the incentive for differential treatment of
ethnic groups dissipates.  This is most likely to happen when institutions such as multiple
checks and balances are in place, which increase the credibility of all government
decisions, reducing the commitment advantage that some government decision makers or
candidates have because of personal ties to some voters or groups of voters.
When politicians emerge from different  income groups,  a different dynamic is at
work. In this case, the ability of politicians to make credible promises to specific
constituencies,  such as the poor or the rich, depends much more on the institutional
environment. When it does not support credible promises, politicians gain nothing by
pitting the rich against the poor, since the poor do not believe the politicians will help
them, once in office. However,  as elections grow more competitive and checks and
balances provide greater assurances  about the credibility of government decisions, the
incentives to seek out and develop  such constituencies  grows. It is in these circumstances,
then, that we expect income and wealth-based polarization to matter most.3
There is substantial, though non-systematic  evidence that parties organized
around "class" or income are not common in developing countries. Haggard and
Kaufman (1992), in an examination of  many episodes of high inflation in a number of
countries,  found very little evidence that parties and political conflict were organized by
income groups.  Inflation in most cases was driven by governments that spent excessively
3 Similarly, income polarization slows growth most in democracies  in the model of Persson and Tabellini
(1994), but for a different reason: in democracies (but not in non-democracies)  policymakers  act to satisfy
8on infrastructure  and development;  independent  groups representing  the interests of the
poor, whether political parties or not, were weak prior to the shifts in spending strategy.
Only in a few of the countries that they studied,  Argentina,  Chile and Brazil, were there
well-organized  "worker" parties.
4. Summarizing the testable predictions
Taken altogether, the foregoing arguments yield a dense but clear-cut set of
predictions.
*  Given multiple veto players, social polarization  should reduce the ability of countries
to respond to shocks (Alesina and Drazen),  and therefore reduce creditworthiness.
*  Provided there is some polarization of veto players, checks and balances  should
increase the credibility of agreements to repay loans and therefore'increase
creditworthiness (from North and Weingast).
*  The effects of income-based polarization should be greater  and the effects of ethno-
linguistic polarization smaller when political promises are more credible - when
there are more checks and balances, and more competitive'elections.
Some of these hypotheses have already received  empirical  attention. With respect to veto
player type arguments, most evidence has focused on political "fragmentation",  defined
in various ways.  Haggard and Kaufman (1992) and Veiga (2000) present evidence that
countries with more fragmented political systems are less likely to embrace stabilization
programs after plunging into a period of high inflation.  Haggard and Kaufman, in their
case studies,  find however that fragmentation  affects country responses to hyperinflation,
but not to other high but non-hyperinflationary episodes. These experimental  settings
the median-income voter.
9allow the authors to evaluate the combined effect of polarization and checks and balances
on responsiveness to crises, but do not allow them to disentangle the two effects nor to
examine their influence on government  credibility.
Haggard and Kaufmann do not directly take the number of veto players in a
government into account in their analysis, although they do consider polarization,
elections and the policy orientation of the ruling government. Their "polarization"
variable comes closest to the hypotheses  above, but does not take into account the
number of veto players.  On a three point scale, a one is assigned to countries with
exclusive one party systems; a two to systems with inclusive or corporatist one-party
systems or two-party systems with broad catch-all parties; and a three to polarized or
fragmented party systems. They do not consider whether or not these parties control veto
gates.
Alesina and Drazen or Rodrik type arguments are more plausible when applied to
broad social polarization than to the polarization of elites. Alesina and Drazen rely on
assumptions about information asymmetry that are easier to justify in reference to broad
groups;  similarly, Rodrik relies on assumptions about the enforceability of inter-group
agreements that are less plausible when the agreements are between different segments of
the elite. Their arguments are best tested with information both about political or partisan
polarization  (the polarization of political parties), and about social polarization.  Haggard
and Kaufman seem to rate as "most" polarized those countries in which both parties and
society at large are polarized, where social polarization seems to be captured by the
existence of organized groups in society that seem to be in conflict with each other. In
this sense, their definition of polarization is partially driven by the contentiousness of the
10policy debate, so that causality is clouded. In the empirical work below, we use only a
priori definitions of polarization (ethno-linguistic or income cleavages), as well as taking
explicit account of the number of institutional veto players.
Veiga pays more attention to the number of veto players and their partisan
affiliations,  encapsulated in his "fragmentation"  variable, also trichotomous,  like Haggard
and Kaufman's  "polarization" measure. Fragmentation is "one" if there are no parties or
an exclusive  one party system; a two if there is a one-party majority parliamentary
govermnent, or a presidential government with one-party control of the legislature and
presidency;  and "greater than two" for other systems. While useful, this variable groups
quite disparate countries into similar categories. For example, legislatures in presidential
systems may act with greater independence,  even when the president's party controls
them, than parliaments with a one party majority.  This is the case if one compares the US
with Great Britain, for example.  The category "greater than two" embraces a large
number of disparate systems, ranging from divided presidential government to highly
fractionalized government coalitions in parliamentary systems. Again, we might expect
differences  among these. The empirical work below uses a more fine-grained measure of
veto players, which also takes into account partisan control of the veto  gates; we also take
social polarization explicitly into account.
Berg and Sachs (1988), Rodrik (1999)  and Quinn and Woolley (2001)  are all
concerned with the effect of social polarization,  and the latter two papers with the
interactive effects of institutions and social polarization. Berg and Sachs (1988) look at
35 countries for which there was information  on sovereign debt discount rates.  Unlike
later researchers,  their focus is not institutional and they do not consider the differentialeffects of  inequality under different institutional arrangements.  They find that countries
with greater income inequality have a higher likelihood of rescheduling debt, and a
higher rate of discount on the debt. We are able to replicate their results, but for a larger
sample of countries,  since our creditworthiness ratings are more widely available. Apart
from considering the institutional dimension, we also use a larger set of polarization
variables, representing not only inequality in income but landholding and also ethnic
fractionalization.
Rodrik (1999) and Quinn and Woolley (2001) are concerned with broader
economic outcomes,  growth before and after the oil crisis in the case of Rodrik and the
volatility of economic growth in the case of Quinn and Woolley (2001).  Their work
examines indirectly the hypotheses that structure this paper.  Rodrik (1999) finds that the
impact of trade shocks on economic performance is worse in the presence of ethnic
fractionalization  or income inequality and in the absence of democracy.  This supports his
contention that social conflict constitutes a barrier to adapting policy to external  shocks
unless there are institutions that moderate conflict and make agreements between
contending groups more credible.  This result potentially contradicts the conclusions of
Alesina and Drazen, however,  since democracies  are characterized in part by their
multiplicity of veto players, which (given social polarization) should delay rather than
accelerate a country's response to growth. Quinn and Woolley (2001)  find different
results, however. Democracy (captured,  as in Rodrik 1999, by Freedom House indices of
political freedoms  and civil liberties) makes economic growth less volatile. Ethnic
fractionalization  has neither a direct effect on volatility, nor does it influence the effect of
democracy.  Their results thus fail to support either model of bargaining,  reform and
12delay. Unlike Rodrik, they permit democracy and ethnic fractionalization to enter
independently,  as well as in a multiplicative  term,  making theirs a more reliable test.
Persson and Tabellini (1994) examine the effect of income inequality on growth,
conditional  on regime type. Building on median voter models of income taxation and
redistribution (e.g., Meltzer and Richard  1981), they argue that inequality should slow
growth more in countries where median voters are more decisive, i.e. in democracies.
Persson and Tabellini present cross-country  evidence  finding that a significant and
negative relationship  between inequality and growth exists only in their sub-sample of
democracies,  and not in the non-democracies.  Knack and Keefer (1997)  show, however,
that these results are an artifact of measurement error in the inequality data and regime
type classifications  used by Persson and Tabellini. Using more standard data sources on
inequality and regime type, the link between inequality and growth is equally strong in
democracies and non-democracies.  Creditworthiness is more directly linked than
economic growth to the decisions of government. Its use in the work below therefore
provides a more direct test of the different hypotheses surrounding the influence of
institutions and polarization on government credibility and response to crisis. In addition,
we use institutional variables  that allow  a more fine-grained examination of how
institutions mediate social polarization and growth, and we address a broader range of
institutional conditions that might influence creditworthiness.
5. Data
Our measure of the creditworthiness  of nations is based on a survey of leading
international banks conducted every six months by Institutional Investor. Bankers  are not
permitted to rate their home countries. The sample ranges from 75 to 100 banks, with
13responses weighted to give more importance to the views of banks with greater
worldwide exposure and more sophisticated  country-analysis systems. It is scored on a 0-
100 basis, with 0 representing the greatest chance of defaulting on the sovereign debt, and
100 assigned to countries with the lowest risk of default.  The mean value among the 106
countries included in our empirical  analyses is 38.8, with a standard deviation of 25.7.
Ratings  exceed 60 for most of the OECD countries, with Japan,  Switzerland, Germany
and the US the only nations above 90. The bottom of the distribution is dominated by
conflict-ridden African and Latin America nations such as Sudan, Sierra Leone, Liberia,
Zaire, Haiti and Nicaragua, all scoring below 10. (Data Appendix II lists ratings from
lowest to highest for all countries included in empirical tests.)
The accuracy of this creditworthiness index is supported by two statistical
analyses. A study of 78 Euromarket loans for 34 countries found that the interest rate
spread was strongly and inversely correlated with the creditworthiness ratings,
controlling for maturity and length of the grace period (Feder and Ross 1982). A GAO
study (1994) found that the creditworthiness index was similarly strongly related to the
discount on 38 sovereign debt instruments, owed by 21 countries, traded on secondary
markets.
In contrast to the limited number of countries for which data are available on
interest rate spreads, or on discounts on debt traded in secondary markets, the
Institutional  Investor index is available for about 130 countries. Use of this subjective
index is preferable to objective indicators on other grounds. Interest spreads are only a
rough reflection of risk, as low interest rate spreads may be offset by high fees or special
tax concessions, which are difficult to measure. Data are available for a large sample of
14countries on the debt-service ratio (interest plus repayment obligations  relative to export
revenue),  or the stock of external debt relative  to GDP. However,  the debt-service ratio is
a misleading gauge of creditworthiness,  and is not a significant predictor of debt
rescheduling (Rahnama-Moghadain  and Samavati  1991). Using the stock of debt as our
dependent variable would require attempting to control for various factors that might
affect a country's ability to repay a large debt. The subjective index we use instead
implicitly adjusts for these factors already--and  probably far more effectively than we
could using statistical controls.
We use the mean value of the creditworthiness measure over the 1986-95 period.
Using data over the ten-year period ensures  that values are not unduly influenced by
business cycle effects or by short-term fluctuations in the prices of petroleum or other key
imported or exported commodities.  We control for the log of initial (1985) per capita
income and for growth in per capita income from  1980-85, just prior to the period of
analysis, as higher values of these may improve the ability of governments  to finance
their debts. Since larger economies tend to be more diverse, and less subject to terms of
trade or other shocks that can suddenly worsen a government's  fiscal position, we also
control for the ratio of a country's aggregate GDP to US GDP. Finally, we control for
shifts in the net barter terms of trade, which represent exogenous changes  in a country's
ability to pay back debt denominated  in foreign currencies. The terms of trade shift is
constructed  as the ratio of the 1986-95 average value, to the 1980-85  average value, of
the ratio of the export price index to the corresponding import price index. Improvements
in the terms of trade over the period for which our dependent variable is measured,
15relative to the preceding period,  are reflected by values exceeding  unity.4 Since it is
precisely through their policy decisions about fiscal and monetary policy that countries
influence their creditworthiness,  we do not attempt to control for endogenous variables
such as inflation or deficit spending.
We assess the impact of three kinds of  polarization and three variables that
describe the political environment.  With respect to polarization, we use a measure of
income inequality, inequality in land ownership,  and ethno-linguistic  polarization.
Although these measures have been used in other contexts in the literature,  only Keefer
and Knack (2002) justify their usage in view of the theoretical literature  on polarization.
We briefly review that discussion here, especially to explain our use of the ethnic
fractionalization  data.
Esteban and Ray (1994:  p. 824) point out that commonly used measures of
polarization may not, in fact, capture polarization in society - they may do just the
opposite. They argue that groups in society are polarized with respect to any set of
attributes when they exhibit the following three characteristics:  the members of each
group are homogeneous with respect to the set of attributes; different groups are
heterogeneous  with respect to these attributes;  and the groups are relatively uniform in
size. Esteban and Ray conclude that polarization is greatest when society is divided into
two similarly sized groups, each internally homogeneous but significantly different from
the others on all possible attributes.
As they observe, most measures of income inequality and ethnic  fractionalization
do not correspond  to these definitions of polarization.  Theoretically  appropriate measures
4 In most cases, these shifts are unlikely to be unanticipated.  To the extent they are anticipated,  the
relationship of shifts to creditworthiness  may weaken as countries expecting improvements  (deteriorations)
16of income-based polarization should be sensitive to the degree of clustering of the
population, which inequality measures derived from the Lorenz curve are not. Similarly,
societies that are completely ethnically fractionalized could be regarded as completely
non-polarized by their definition.
In Keefer and Knack (2002), we justify the use of Gini measures of inequality by
showing that theoretical objections may not be empirically important.  Using data
available from a few countries that includes the percentage of the population at each
income level, one could construct  a theoretically robust measure of income polarization
that turns out to be strongly correlated  with the Gini coefficient  calculated  from the same
data.
It turns out to be a simpler matter to transform measures of ethno-linguistic
fractionalization  into a theoretically adequate measure of ethnic polarization.  We use
Sullivan's (1991) measure of the fraction of the population belonging to the largest
ethnic, linguistic or religious group (whichever cleavage  is judged by Sullivan to be most
salient in a society).5 As Keefer and Knack (2002) argue,  following Horowitz (1985),
polarization ought to be lowest when this fraction is either smallest (reflecting many very
small groups) or highest (reflecting only one group).  To capture this non-linearity,  we
include a quadratic ethnic fractionalization  term in the first sets of regressions below.
The quality of income inequality data is a second concern. As in Keefer and
Knack (2002), we use the income inequality data compiled by Deininger and Squire
may borrow more (less) in  the current period.
5  An index of "etno-linguistic  fractionalization"  reported in  Taylor and Hudson (1983), has been widely
used in  the economics and political  science  literature. The Sullivan measure has substantially greater
country coverage, as the fractionalization  index is  not reported for many African and other countries which
were not yet independent when  the variable was  constructed in  about  1960. The homogeneity variable  and
the fractionalization  index are correlated  at -.60.
17(1996). This dataset has greater coverage over time and across countries than any
previous compilation.  In addition, and more importantly, they identify a "high quality"
subset of observations.  Deininger and Squire conclude that many observations in
previous compilations fail to meet the minimum standards of quality required for
inclusion in their dataset.  Because our empirical tests examine inequality's impact on
creditworthiness  over the 1986-95 period, we chose inequality observations  as close to
1985 as possible.6 The mean year for observations is 1985, with a standard deviation of
4.8 years.
Societies can also be polarized according to holdings of assets. Land inequality is
the only measure of asset inequality with broad country coverage. Gini coefficients for
land inequality circa 1960 and 1970 are available from Taylor and Jodice (1983); Muller
and Seligson (1987) include some additional values for circa 1970. Jazairy et al. (1992)
report observations for more recent years for many countries.  All of the land inequality
observations are based on official agricultural censuses undertaken by the UN Food and
Agriculture Organization,  although they have not been subjected to the level of scrutiny
Deininger and Squire (1996) have applied to income inequality data.
Finally, we use two political variables from the Database of Political Institutions
(Beck et al. 2001). The number of veto players is captured by the variable Checks, which
counts as veto players the president and each legislative chamber in a presidential system.
The variable is incremented by one unless the president's party has a majority in the
lower house and  there is a closed list system (by which legislative candidates must be
6 Where no measure was available for  1985, a decision rule was consistently applied for selecting between
available observations.  This rule treated the possibility of reverse  causation introduced from selecting later
years as a more serious problem than increased measurement error resulting from the selection of earlier
years.  Specifically,  the rule was to choose the year satisfying the function: min [2(year - 1985);  1985 -
18selected by party leaders) that weakens legislator autonomy from the president. In
parliamentary systems, the prime minister and each coalition party that is not his or her
own count as veto players. If there is no closed list electoral rule, the prime minister's
party counts as a veto player, and Checks is incremented by one. Checks is set to one
automatically in any country in which presidential elections are not competitive, on the
presumption that formal institutional checks  and balances are unlikely to operate in
practice. We use the mean value for each country over the 1986-95 period.
Our second political variable, the competitiveness of executive elections, is based
on another variable from the Database on Political Institutions which is coded from one
to seven. Where there is no functioning executive, countries are coded 1. Where
executives are unelected, they are coded 2. Where elections are not open to multiple
candidates or parties, countries are coded in the 3-5 range (See Data Appendix HI  for
details.)  Countries in which multiple parties can and do compete and present candidates,
but the winning candidate receives more than 75 percent of the vote are coded 6; a 7 is
assigned if the winner receives less than 75 percent of the vote.
We create  a dichotomous variable from this scale, with countries in which
multiple candidates  from multiple parties compete classified as having competitive
elections and all other countries classified as non-competitive.  Specifically, countries
assigned to either the 6 or 7 category for the majority of years during the 1986-95 period
were classified as competitive and all others  as non-competitive.
6. Results
The regressions in Table 1 address whether social polarization reduces
creditworthiness,  abstracting from political institutions. The first three regressions
year]. Ties were resolved in favor of selecting the earlier year (for example,  1983 over 1986).
19examine income polarization  (income inequality).  All show that income inequality
increases the likelihood of default on debt. In the first equation, the coefficient on income
inequality suggests that each two point increase  in Gini is associated with a 1.2 point
decline in the creditworthiness  index. Each standard deviation increase in income
inequality (i.e. an increase of 9.5 in Gini) reduces creditworthiness by more than one-fifth
of a standard deviation (beta = .2), or 5 points. This effect is comparable to that of
income growth, and exceeds the effects of higher aggregate income (beta = .12) or
improvements in the terms of trade (beta = .15).7
Equation 2 differs from equation  1 by weighting observations by aggregate GDP,
instead of weighting all observations equally. The relationship between inequality and
creditworthiness is even stronger in this test than in equation 1, indicating that the strong
effect of inequality is not driven merely by a few very small countries.8 Equation 3
differs from equation  1 by using median regression analysis rather than OLS. In median
regression (see Gould and Rogers  1994), observations  lying far from the regression line
are weighted less heavily than in OLS. The inequality coefficient  is nearly identical to
that in equation 1, indicating that the relationship  is not produced by a small number of
extreme cases.
Equations 4-7 report results using the alternative measures  of  polarization or
specifications. The results for land inequality, in equation 4, exhibit the right sign (more
7 In all regressions, the four control variables are positively and significantly related to creditworthiness.
Income per capita is the strongest of the four: each standard deviation increase is associated with an
increase of more than three-fiftis of a standard deviation in creditworthiness  in equation  1.  Each 4
percentage-point  increase in aggregate  GDP (as a percentage of U.S. GDP) is associated  with a 1-point
increase  in the creditworthiness index. Each I percentage-point increase in annual per capita income
growth is associated with a 2-point increase  in the index. Each 7 percentage-point improvement in the
termns of trade (e.g.  from I to 1.07) is  associated with a rise of 1.4 points in creditworthiness.
20land inequality undermines  creditworthiness),  but the coefficient is not significant at
conventional levels. However, controlling for income inequality, in equation 5, both land
and income inequality are shown to have a significant negative effect on
creditworthiness.  Each one-unit increase in the Gini for land inequality reduces
creditworthiness by one-fifth of one point.
Ethnic homogeneity is entered in equation 6 in quadratic form, to better capture
the theoretical relationship between ethnic homogeneity and ethnic polarization, as
discussed above. Consistent with that discussion, both ethnic homogeneity and its square
are significant at the .01 level.  Creditworthiness declines as the percent belonging to the
largest group increases, up to about 70 percent, and increases  thereafter.
Equation 7 examines all of the polarization measures jointly.9 Income and land
inequality both remain strongly significant. Coefficients  on homogeneity and its square
decline somewhat relative to equation 5, and are not statistically significant in this
smaller sample.
Tables 2 and 3 add the two political variables,  and their interactions with each of
the three polarization variables. To avoid interacting a variable with another that is
already interacted with itself, we replace the quadratic form of ethnic homogeneity in
these tables with a simple transformation:  the deviation in absolute value from 70
percent. This value  is chosen based on the results of equation 5 in Table 1, which indicate
8 The aggregate GDP of the U.S. is 20,000 times that of Seychelles.  The logic for treating each country
equally is that they each represent a single natural experiment  in economic policy making.
9Low correlations  among income inequality, land inequality,  and ethnic homogeneity suggest that
societies are in general polarized in different ways across different dimensions.  Income and land inequality
are correlated  at only .09 among the 64 nations in our sample with data available on both variables. Ethnic
homogeneity is correlated with income and land inequality, respectively,  at only -.25 (N = 75) and .03 (N =
84). Quadratic associations between inequality and homogeneity are even weaker: homogeneity  and
homogeneity squared explain only 7% of the variation in income inequality, and 0.1% of the variation in
21that creditworthiness  is minimized when 70 percent of the population belongs to one
ethnic or linguistic group.1I  Because larger deviations from 70% are associated with
higher creditworthiness,  we will call this variable "ethnic harmony."
Table 2 tests the hypotheses that social polarization reduces creditworthiness,  that
checks and balances  increases it, and that the effects of each are dependent upon the
other. The coefficient  estimates on Checks (the number of veto players) indicate that the
number of veto players has a positive effect on creditworthiness.  In the larger samples
(equations 3 and 5), this effect is marginally significant, with each extra veto player
associated with an improvement of about 2 points in the 100-point creditworthiness
index.  That is, the credibility effects of checks and balances  appear to outweigh the
responsiveness effects in the assessments of creditworthiness.
The effects of social polarization depend significantly on the number of veto
players. Equation 2 of Table 2 shows that the negative  effects of income inequality are
significantly greater when there are more checks and balances. 1 1 The coefficient of the
interaction between land inequality and Checks is also negative in equation 4, but not
significant.  Equation 6, which looks at ethnic polarization and its interaction with
Checks, demonstrates the contrary result: ethnic harmony improves creditworthiness most
when there are fewer veto players, and this beneficial effect diminishes significantly as
the number of veto players increases. This is the first piece of evidence for the final
hypothesis, that the nature of polarized groups influences their effects on policy.
land inequality.
10 This value is also very close to the sample mean of 68.5%.
11  The interaction terms in equations 2 and 4 are constructed as the deviation of the inequality variables
from their sample means, multiplied by the deviation of checks from its mean value of 3.
22Table 3 pursues this theme, adding the competitiveness  of executive elections and
interacting it with the social polarization variables. Electoral competitiveness is
negatively but (generally) not significantly associated with creditworthiness.  We would
expect that more organized groups would have a greater effect on policy when voters are
least "empowered",  as when elections are non-competitive.  If ethnic groups are more
organized than income groups, we would expect the effects of ethnic harnony on
creditworthiness to be greatest when elections are least competitive. In contrast, the
distribution of income should affect creditworthiness more when elections  are more
competitive. Equations 2, 4 and 6 provide evidence that this is the case. In equations 2
and 4, the interaction of land or income inequality with electoral competitiveness is
negative and significant, indicating that inequality has a stronger negative effect on
creditworthiness when elections are more competitive. 12 However,  the negative
coefficient on the ethnic harmony interaction in equation 6 signifies the opposite: more
ethnic harmony (larger deviations from 70% belonging to the largest group) is less
beneficial to creditworthiness  - or, ethnic strife is less damaging -- when elections are
more competitive. This interaction  term is significant only at the .12 level, however,  for a
two-tailed test.
Table 4 provides a summary of the effect of changes in the social polarization
variables, conditional  on different levels of Checks and electoral competitiveness.  The
pattern of asterisks underlines the stark differences between ethnic polarization and
income inequality. The impact of ethnic polarization is greatest (i.e. ethnic harmony is
most beneficial, or ethnic divisions most damaging)  at low levels of both Checks and
12 The interaction terms in  equations 2  and 4 are constructed as the deviation of inequality  from their
sample means, multiplied by the electoral competitiveness  dummy.
23electoral competitiveness.  It is not significant where elections are competitive or where
there are four or more checks. In contrast, inequality is most damaging  at high levels of
both Checks and electoral competitiveness. Both land and income inequality are
significant only where elections  are competitive. Income inequality is significant except
where there are no checks on the executive (i.e. Checks equals one). Land inequality is
significant only where checks is less than three.
7. Summary
Our finding that social polarization is associated with reduced creditworthiness is
consistent with the Alesina and Drazen (1991) model of delayed stabilizations.  Our
results, using a different dependent variable, corroborate those of Berg and Sachs (1988),
who found inequality was associated with a greater likelihood of defaulting on debt, and
a higher discount on debt in secondary markets.  We find that on average,  more veto
players are associated with improved  creditworthiness, consistent with the analysis by
North and Weingast (1992) of English sovereign borrowing in the  17th and  18th centuries.
This result is somewhat contradictory  to those of Veiga (2000) and Haggard and
Kaufman (1992), who find that fragmented political systems slow responses to inflation
crises; however, our dependent  variable reflects both credibility and responsiveness  to
crisis. Our results also show that the effects of social polarization and institutions are
highly inter-dependent, providing a unifying basis for assessing the implications of these
different strands of the literature.
Finally, results of our interaction tests are consistent with our claim that Olson's
insights regarding the importance of the internal organization of groups are important to
consider in evaluating the effects of social polarization.  Where elections  are not
24competitive and there are few checks on executive power, a candidate's promises will be
less credible to members of other ethnic  groups, and the candidate will have an incentive
to promise higher spending that benefits his or her own group. Accordingly, ethnic
divisions undermine  (or, ethnic harmony enhances) creditworthiness  more where checks
are few and elections are less competitive. In contrast to the high social and economic
costs of  reneging on promises to one's own ethnic group, the costs to reneging on
promises made to income groups appear to be relatively low. Those promises will be
more credible when competitive  elections and checks and balances increase the
predictability of government decision making. Accordingly, inequality undermines
creditworthiness more where checks are more prevalent and elections are competitive.
25Table 1
Polarization and Creditworthiness
Equation  1  2  3  4  5  6  7
Method  OLS  WLS  Median  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS
Constant  -81.25  -88.36  -90.18  -119.44  -82.82  -107.09  -82.55
(14.20)  (11.39)  (21.91)  (12.42)  (13.31)  (11.86)  (14.64)
GDP per capita  16.52**  19.00**  17.30**  19.18**  18.17**  19.22**  19.62**
1985  (1.43)  (1.00)  (2.12)  (1.36)  (1.43)  (1.36)  (1.47)
Growth  1980-  2.04**  1.47#  2.08**  1.48**  1.56**  1.77**  1.83**
85  (0.64)  (0.75)  (0.72)  (0.52)  (0.57)  (0.46)  (0.60)
Aggregate  0.24**  0.09**  0.26#  0.29*  0.26**  0.29*  0.24**
GDP 1985  (0.09)  (0.02)  (0.15)  (0.12)  (0.09)  (0.12)  (0.09)
Terms of trade  13.68**  17.73**  15.91**  12.86*  11.06*  15.12**  14.34*
shift  (4.40)  (3.78)  (6.21)  (5.90)  (4.90)  (5.51)  (5.63)
Gini: income  -0.60**  -0.94**  -0.59**  -0.54**  0.49**
Inequality  (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.21)  (0.16)  (0.16
Gini: land  -0.12  -0.20**  -0.18*
inequality  (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.07)
Ethnic  -0.70**  -0.52
homogeneity  (0.23)  (0.33)
Ethnic  .005**  .003
homog.2 (.002)  (.002)
N  76  76  76  84  64  105  64
R2/PseudoR 2 .83  .94  .60  .80  .87  .79  .87
S.E. of est.  11.0  6.3  --  12.3  10.2  12.0  10.0
Mean, D.V.  42.4  72.2  42.4  41.2  44.0  39.0  44.0
Dependent variable  = International Investor Index of Creditworthiness,  averaged over  1986-95.  Inequality
measures are circa  1985. Standard errors are calculated using White's (1980) heteroskedastic-consistent
variance-covariance  matrix. A #, * or ** indicates  significance at .10, .05, or .01 level respectively for two-
tailed tests. Note R 2does not have its usual interpretation in WLS (equation 2).
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Checks and Balances,  Polarization, and Creditworthiness
Equation  1  2  3  4  5  6
Constant  -76.21  -69.09  -107.39  -103.60  -120.00  -125.99
(15.35)  (15.31)  (13.25)  (13.00)  (11.21)  (11.48)
GDP per capita  15.21**  14.71**  17.31**  17.02**  17.19**  18.07**
1985  (1.80)  (1.77)  (1.70)  (1.63)  (1.47)  (1.50)
Growth  1980-85  2.11**  2.15**  1.31*  1.27*  1.70**  1.70**
(0.66)  (0.63)  (0.53)  (0.52)  (0.46)  (0.45)
Aggregate GDP  0.23**  0.24**  0.28*  0.31*  0.29**  0.27*
1985  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.11)  (0.12)  (0.11)  (0.12)
Terms of trade  12.65**  11.42*  9.88#  9.60#  12.23**  12.83**
shift  (4.45)  (4.55)  (5.74)  (5.59)  (4.72)  (4.61)
Gini: income  -0.55**  -0.58**
Inequality  (0.17)  (0.17)
Gini: land  -0.13  -0.15 '
inequality  (0.08)  (0.08)
Ethnic harmony  0.24**  0.18*
(0.08)  (0.09)
Checks (# of veto  1.47  0.96  2.02#  1.98#  1.64#  1.31
players)  (1.15)  (1.40)  (1.10)  (1.09)  (0.92)  (0.92)
Inequality*  -0.1 8#  -0.06
Checks  (0.11)  (0.06)
Ethnic harmony  -0.12*
*Checks  (0.06)
N  76  76  84  84  105  105
R2  .84  .85  .81  .81  .80  .81
S.E. of est.  10.9  10.7  12.2  12.1  11.9  11.7.
Mean, D.V.  42.4  42.4  41.2  41.2  39.0  39.0
Dependent variable = International Investor Index of Creditworthiness,  averaged over
1986-95. Inequality measures are circa  1985. Standard errors are calculated using White's
(1980) heteroskedastic-consistent  variance-covariance  matrix. A ", * or **  indicates
significance at .10, .05, or .01  level respectively for two-tailed tests. Inequality*Checks  =
(deviation of Gini from sample mean)*(deviation of Checks from 3).  Ethnic
harmony*Checks = (deviation of homogeneity from 70%, in absolute value)*(deviation
of Checks from 3).
27Table 3
Electoral Competitiveness,  Polarization, and Creditworthiness
Equation  1  2  3  4  5  6
Constant  -99.47  -103.17  -128.90  -135.58  -136.73  -142.76
(12.55)  (15.04)  (13.11)  (14.48)  (11.31)  (11.45)
GDP per capita  18.21**  17.33**  20.28**  19.59**  19.88**  20.22**
1985  (1.60)  (1.66)  (1.54)  (1.52)  (1.46)  (1.42)
Growth  1980-85  2.06**  2.02**  1.65**  1.45**  1.81**  1.80**
(0.61)  (0.59)  (0.56)  (0.53)  (0.45)  (0.45)
Aggregate GDP  0.24**  0.24**  0.27*  0.31*  0.30*  0.29*
1985  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.13)  (0.13)
Terms of trade  14.81**  15.22**  15.24**  15.88**  16.89**  17.22**
shift  (4.31)  (4.22)  (5.67)  (5.575  (4.85)  (5.01)
Gini: income  -0.55**  -0.19
Inequality  (0.16)  (0.24)
Gini: land  -0.09  0.13
inequality  (0.08)  (0.12)
Ethnic harmony  0.20**  0.32**
(0.08)  (0.09)
Electoral  -5.94  -4.57  -5.23  -4.95  -5.66#  -5.74#
competitiveness  (3.97)  (3.99)  (4.03)  (3.82)  (3.27)  (3.23)
Inequality*  -0.55*  -0.40*
competitiveness  (0.27)  (0.18)
Ethnic harmony  -0.23
*competitiveness  (0.15)
N  76  76  84  84  105  105
R2  .84  .85  .80  .81  .80  .80
S.E. of est.  10.8  10.6  12.3  12.0  11.9  11.9
Mean, D.V.  42.7  42.7  41.2  41.2  39.0  39.0
Dependent variable = International Investor Index of Creditworthiness,  averaged over
1986-95. Inequality measures are circa 1985. Standard errors are calculated using White's
(1980) heteroskedastic-consistent  variance-covariance  matrix. A #, * or ** indicates
significance at .10, .05, or .01 level respectively for two-tailed tests.
Inequality*competitiveness  = (deviation of Gini from sample mean)*(competitiveness).
Ethnic harmony*competitiveness  = (deviation of homogeneity from 70%, in absolute
value)*(competitiveness).
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Conditional coefficients  and standard errors
Impact on creditworthiness  of 1-unit
increase in....
Conditional on:  Gini  Gini  Ethnic
(income)  (land)  harmony
Checks  1  -0.23  -0.02  0.41**
(0.25)  (0.13)  0.10
2  -0.41*  -0.08  0.29**
(0.19)  (0.09)  (0.08)
3  -0.58**  -0.15#  0.18*
(0.17)  (0.08)  (0.09)
4  -0.76**  -0.21*  0.06
(0.21)  (0.10)  (0.13)
5  -0.93**  -0.27  -0.05
(0.29)  (0.15)  (0.18)
6  -1.11**  -0.33  -0.17
(0.38)  (0.19)  (0.23)
7  -1.29**  -0.39  -0.28
_  (0.48)  (0.25)  (0.29)
Electoral  0  -0.19  0.13  0.32**
competitiveness =  (0.24)  (0.12)  (0.09)
1  -0.74**  -0.27*  0.09
(0.16)  (0.11)  (0.12)
A #, * or ** indicates significance at .10, .05,  or .01 level respectively for two-tailed tests.
Note the maximum value for Checks is 7.65 (the average for France over the period) and
the minimum value is 1.
29Data Appendix I
Summary Statistics
N  Mean  Std.  Min.  Max.
dev.
Creditworthiness  index  106  38.8  25.7  5.9  93.4
Gini income inequality  76  41.7  9.5  25.2  63.2
Gini land inequality (N=84)  84  55.1  16.1  8.0  95.6
Ethnic homogeneity (N=105)  105  68.5  25.0  17  100
Ethnic harmony  fN=105)  105  21.0  13.5  0  53
Log GDP per capita  1985  106  7.97  1.06  5.70  9.72
Per capita annual growth  1980-85  106  -0.1  3.3  -10.7  6.9
Aggregate GDP 1985  (% of US)  106  3.5  10.8  .005  100
Net barter terms of trade shift  106  0.94  0.27  0.41  1.95
Electoral competitiveness  (0-1)  106  0.62  0.49  0  1
Checks (number of veto players)  106  2.89  1.74  1  7.64
Data Appendix II
Countries in sample (with creditworthiness values)
Sudan (5.9), Nicaragua (6.9), Uganda (6.9), Sierra Leone (7.2), Haiti (8.3), Liberia (8.4),
Mozambique (8.8), Zaire (9.0), Ethiopia (9.2), Zambia (11.1), Tanzania (11.8),  El
Salvador (11.9), Angola (12.3), Iraq (12.8), Guinea (13.7), Bolivia (13.9), Honduras
(14.1), Myanmar (14.2),  Congo Rep. (14.7), Peru (14.9), Benin (16.2), Mali (16.5),
Guatemala (16.5),  Togo (16.8),  Malawi (16.9),  Seychelles (17.1)
Burkina Faso (17.2),  Dominican Rep.  (17.6), Bangladesh (18.9), Jamaica (19.3),  Senegal
(19.3),  Nigeria (19.7), Syria (20.4), Cote D'Ivoire (20.8), Swaziland (21.5), Ecuador
(21.9), Costa Rica (22.1), Panama (23.1), Nepal (23.5), Iran (24.3), Sri Lanka (24.9),
Philippines (26.3), Argentina (26.3),  Egypt (26.4), Zimbabwe (26.6), Ghana (27.5),
Cameroon (27.5), Kenya (27.7), Paraguay (28.2), Jordan (28.2), Morocco (29.1), Pakistan
(29.4), Brazil (29.6), Mauritania (30.1)
Gabon (30.3), Uruguay (31.4), Papua New Guinea (32.6), Trinidad  & Tobago  (33.6),
Venezuela (36.1), Algeria (36.1), Barbados (36.3), Guinea-Bissau  (36.4), South Africa
(37.0), Mexico (37.2), Israel (37.4), Tunisia (38.7), Colombia (39.0), Chile (39.4),
Turkey (41.7), Mauritius (43.4), Botswana (43.8), India (44.7), Cyprus (45.9), Greece
(48.0), Indonesia (48.5), Oman (51.1), Iceland (54.2),  Kuwait (54.2),  Saudi Arabia (59.2),
Thailand  (59.5), Malta (60.1)
Malaysia (61.4), Portugal (61.5), New Zealand (65.2), Korea (66.4), Ireland (67.1),
Australia (70.8), Spain (74.2), Denmark (74.3), Finland (75.2), Italy (76.5), Taiwan
(77.1),  Singapore (78.1),  Sweden (78.1),  Belgium (78.5), Norway (79.6), Canada (84.0),
Austria (84.4),  Luxembourg (84.5), UK (86.4), France (86.5), Netherlands  (87.8), USA
(90.4), Germany (91.9),  Switzerland (93.3), Japan (93.4)
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Coding of Political Institutions Variables
Executive  index of electoral competitiveness  (EIEC)
No executive:  1
Unelected executive:  2
Elected,  1 candidate:  3
1 party, multiple candidates:  4
multiple parties are legal:  5
multiple parties with multiple candidates, but
the winner received more than 75% of the votes:  6
winner received less than 75% of votes:  7
*  Executives who are:
1) Elected directly by population, or
2) Elected by an electoral college that is elected by the people and has the sole
purpose of electing the executive, are scored on the above scale.
*  Executives elected by bodies other than these are given the same score that the
electing body would get. Even if the electing body is not the actual "legislature" (such
as an appointed electoral college), the competitiveness  of that body is used to score
the executive.
*  This means that competitively elected prime ministers get 6 or 7. The chief executives
of Communist nations (the chairman of the Communist Party) is given a 3, because
they are elected by the Party Congress, electing bodies which they do not appoint.
Executives elected by small, appointed juntas or by appointed electoral  colleges get 2.
*  Rival chief executives in one country, particularly in the setting of armed conflicts,
are counted as No executives,  and thus score a 1.
*  Referenda and votes by "popular acclamation"  on unelected executives are scored as
3.
*  If executives unilaterally extend their terms of office, they get a 2 starting in the year
they should have held elections.  Any executive elected for life, even by the people or
an elected assembly, gets a 2. This elected-for-life rule is slightly different from that
followed for legislatures that unilaterally extend their rule.
Checks /
Checks equals one if  the above index (EIEC), or the legislative index of electoral
competitiveness (LIEC, also from Beck et al., 2000), is less than 5: countries where
legislatures are not competitively elected are considered countries where only the
executive wields a check. In presidential systems:  (1) if ELEC is greater than 6, Checks  is
31incremented by one to distinguish countries with competitively elected presidents and no
other checks (see (2) and (3)) from countries with non-competitively elected presidents;
(2) if the opposition controls the legislature,  Checks is incremented by one; (3) Checks is
incremented by one for each chamber of the legislature UNLESS  the president's party
has a majority in the lower house AND a closed list system is in effect (implying stronger
presidential control of his/her party, and therefore of the legislature); (4) if the first
government party has a position on economic issues closer to the largest opposition party
than to the party of the executive,  Checks is incremented  by one. In parliamentary
systems: (1) if LIEC is greater than 6, Checks is incremented by one, to establish
equivalence with presidential checks counting;  (2) if the opposition controls the
legislature, Checks is incremented by one; (3) for every party in the government
coalition, up to the largest three parties, Checks is incremented by one; (4) Checks is
incremented by the number of "other" government parties if  the total number of
government  seats in the legislature without taking those parties into account is less than
50 percent; (5)  for every party in the government coalition that has a position on
economic issues closer to the largest opposition party than to the party of the executive,
Checks is incremented by one.
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